Two brief remarks on the possibility of possible

Aristotle once wrote that the "change is the actuality of possibility qua possibility" - an assertment which was more than once declared as lacking in clarity. But as far as I am concerned, this statement is perfectly clear. What Aristotle is trying to say is that the possibilty as such has its own form of actuality: and this paradoxical actuality is that of change. In other words, possibility and actuality are not two distinct ontological "spheres" - they are rather interwoven and inscribed into each other. Thus the possible is not merely lurking on the borders of the positive fullness of the actual but has its own mode of actuality, and the change is that which actualizes the possibility, makes it manifest in the actual itself. But we must be careful on this point. The actualization of possible qua possible, of possible as such, is not the same actualization as that of, for example, man's ability to run. While running, his potentiality to run is indeed actualized. But what is left aside is the actualization of this potentialiy as potentiality. And this is exactly the point Aristotle is turning our attention to: to the question of what is the specific mode of existence of the not-yet-existing and what is the Being of yet-to-be.

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The ontology of a capitalism seems like a kind of philosophical bricolage made by a rather confused mind. Basically, one can find elements of any given philosophy: in capitalism, there is the rule of Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason (the reason of the market), spinozian notion of good and bad as utilitarian categories, Deleuze's dispersion, Heidegger's elaboration of the role of technology, and so on and so forth. But there is one principle in this chaotic mixture of philosophical statements that can claim an axiomatic status. This axiom of capitalism (and its coresponding phenomenons, such as democracy) goes something like this: what is false (or nonexistent) in actuality is as such impossible. Or: what is false in empirical is false in principle.
Let me illustrate this axiom with well-known example of modern utopias and their criticisms. Today, when one tries to subvert the concept of various utopias, one doesn't have to do it on a plane of principle. The critics of kibbutz namely can only say the community ignoring the role of the kinship and the famous "maternal instinct" is as such doomed to unsuccess. In fact, what they are trying to say is that kibbutz is bad IN PRINCIPLE because it is bad EMPIRICALLY. Or, to use even more vulgar example: critics of communism say it is wrong THEORETICALLY because it "doesn't work" in PRACTICE. In capitalism, there is no longer any distinction between what holds in principle and what stands the test of time and space. What is today concidered true in principle is only that which is proven as endurable and sustainable in the empirical. To put it in Aristotle's terms: the actual has absolute ontological primacy over the potential. While Aristotle thought that only that which was once in potentia can also become in actu, today we know that inversely only that which is actual can be posited also as possible.